As the documents published here show, the leaders of Mysore, Tehri Garhwal, Manipur and Udaipur did not sign the status quo agreements annexed to the IoAs and Lord Mountbatten did not attach his signature to them. In all these cases, the status quo agreements were signed by the sovereigns` subordinates. In the case of Mysore, the status quo agreement was signed by Le Dewan (Prime Minister) of Mysore, in the case of Manipur by the Private Secretary of the Maharajas, in that of Tehri Garhwal by the Chief Secretary of State and, in the case of Udaipur, by the then Prime Minister. On 15 August, the State of Junagadh concluded the instrument of accession and the status quo agreement with Pakistan. It was adopted by Pakistan on 13 September.  Junagadh was the only state to declare Pakistan`s membership until August 15.  Another weakness of the merger treaty is that, knowingly or unknownly, the king signed the treaty only for himself, his heirs and successors, and in part not on behalf of the people of Manipur or the people`s ministry. This fact has certainly left space for the people of Manipur to reject or approve its action, which has seriously affected the binding nature of this agreement. The two draft contracts were submitted to the Prince`s Chamber on 25 July.
A state negotiating committee, composed of ten sovereigns and twelve ministers, was set up to discuss the two agreements. After discussion, the Committee finalised the two draft agreements on 31 July.  It should be recalled that not all States had followed this third process. For example, Jammu and Kashmir, which is part of the Indian Union, is based solely on the instrument of accession; There was no ”merger” agreement between its ruler and the Dominion government of India. As far as judicial proceedings are concerned, it has taken the form of three distinct types of agreements: (a) the standstill agreement, (b) the instrument of accession and (c) the merger agreement. The first, the status quo agreement, was essentially to maintain the existing communication and management agreements between ”British India” and the ”princely states” until new alternative regulations came into force. Some local leaders of the Princes tried to buy time by declaring that they would sign the status quo agreement, but not the instrument of accession, until they had time to choose. In response, the Government of India took the position that it would only sign status quo agreements with states that had acceded.  Until August 15, 1947, the fixed date and date of India`s independence, all but four princely states within India, about 560 of them, signed both the instrument of accession and the status quo agreement with India.
The exceptions were Hyderabad, a large state in central India, enlarged by two months, and three small states of Gujarat: Junagadh and its subsidiaries (Mangrol and Babariawad).  According to K.M. Munshi, appointed Indian agent general in Hyderabad, the Indians felt that the conclusion of a status quo agreement with Hyderabad meant that India had lost control of Hyderabad`s affairs. The Hyderabad State Congress opposed it because it was seen by the Indian government as a sign of weakness.  See . . .